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A number of recent studies have reported that decision quality is enhanced under conditions of 
inattention or distraction (unconscious thought; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 
2006; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).  These reports have generated considerable controversy, for both 
experimental (problems of replication) and theoretical reasons (interpretation). Here we report 
the results of four experiments.  The first experiment replicates the unconscious thought effect, 
under conditions that validate and control the subjective criterion of decision quality.  The second 
and third experiments examine the impact of a mode of thought manipulation (without distraction) 
on decision quality in immediate decisions. Here we find that intuitive or affective manipulations 
improve decision quality compared to analytic/deliberation manipulations.  The fourth experiment 
combines the two methods (distraction and mode of thought manipulations) and demonstrates 
enhanced decision quality, in a situation that attempts to preserve ecological validity.  The results 
are interpreted within a framework that is based on two interacting subsystems of decision-
making: an affective/intuition based system and an analytic/deliberation system.
Keywords: complex decisions, intuition, affect, distraction, implicit learning, two-system theory
them all together in one view, I endeavor to estimate their respective 
weights; and, where I find two (one on each side) that seem equal, I 
strike them both out. If I find a reason pro equal to some two reasons 
con, I strike out the three. If I judge some two reasons con, equal to 
some three reasons pro, I strike out the five; and thus proceeding I find 
at length where the balance lies; and… I come to a determination 
accordingly.” (Franklin, 1772).
Initial research in decision-making has provided support for 
this view, in the form of a variety of decision biases that have been 
attributed to the shortcomings of the intuitive mode (Kahneman, 
2003). Prominent examples are reference and decoy effects, loss-
aversion, and violations of invariance and of transitivity, which 
have been explained by assuming that intuitive decisions involve 
the deployment of a set of heuristics (Tversky, 1969; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). Similarly, affect 
has also been associated with decision biases thought to reflect 
a type of heuristic (Winkielman et al., 1997; Raghunathan and 
Pham, 1999; Finucane et al., 2000; Au et al., 2003). Recent work, 
however, indicates a need to re-evaluate this assessment. First, it 
has been proposed that the association between heuristics (such 
as lexicographic rules, responsible for violations of intransitivity; 
Tversky, 1969) and intuition in decision-making is unwarranted. 
In a series of studies, Glöckner and colleagues have demonstrated 
that one can distinguish experimentally, between the deployment 
of such heuristics, which are sequential and rule-based, and the 
deployment of fast/parallel but compensatory modes of decision-
making, which characterize the intuitive mode (Glöckner, 2008; 
Glöckner and Betsch, 2008a,b; see also Holyoak and Simon, 1999, 
for previous work on decision-making by constraint-satisfaction). 
Furthermore, recent studies have reported that framing effects (e.g., 
IntroductIon
Research in the last 20 years indicates that human cognition involves 
two qualitatively different processing modes. The first one is fast, 
affective, parallel, associative, and holistic and has been attributed 
to the operation of an experiential/affective or intuitive system, 
while the second is slower, sequential, rule-based, and analytic 
and has been attributed to the operation of a rational or a delib-
eration system (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Evans, 2003, 2008; 
Kahneman, 2003; Ferreira et al., 2006; Kahneman and Frederick, 
2007; but see Keren and Schul, 2009). As each of these processing 
modes has its strengths and limitations, for each cognitive activity, 
optimal performance requires an adequate mix of the two modes. 
Decision-making is a cognitive activity, which has traditionally 
been thought of as the normative play-field of rational delibera-
tion. Accordingly, one should consider the various aspects of the 
alternatives, consciously evaluate the risks and values, and decide 
through careful analysis the expected (or weighted) utility of each 
option. This prescription, which is part of the normative deci-
sion approach (subjective expected utility; Savage, 1954, or multi-
attribute weighted utility; Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1976; Edwards and Fasolo, 2001; Edwards and Newman, 
2003) is illustrated by the famous decision advice given by Benjamin 
Franklin to his friend Joseph Priestly: “When these difficult cases 
occur, they are difficult, chiefly because, while we have them under 
consideration, all the reasons pro and con are not present to the mind 
at the same time… To get over this, my way is to divide half a sheet of 
paper by a line into two columns; writing over the one pro, and over 
the other con; then during three or four days’ consideration, I put down 
under the heads short hints of the different motives that at different 
times occur to me, for or against the measure. When I have thus got 
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in the Asian disease problem) increase (rather than decrease, as the 
traditional view predicts) with the motivation to deliberate (Igou 
and Bless, 2007). Second, it is possible that the traditional view has 
underestimated the power of the intuitive/affective mode. Herbert 
Simon, who was the first to appreciate the capacity limitations of 
conscious processing in decision-making, has warned us that: “…
there is a complete lack of evidence that, in actual choice situations 
of any complexity, these [rational] computations can be, or are in 
fact, performed… but we cannot, of course, rule out the possibility 
that the un-conscious is a better decision maker than the conscious.” 
(Simon, 1955, p. 104).
Simon’s warning is now supported by two lines of research. 
First, neuropsychological studies of decision-making and of social 
cognition have indicated the existence of an affective or somatic 
process, which under certain conditions plays a substantial (rather 
than a biasing) role in value integration and in intuitive judgments 
(Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio, 1994; Lieberman, 2000; Stout et al., 
2004; Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Fellows, 2006; Weller et al., 2007; 
for review see Weber and Johnson, 2009). For example, affect is 
thought to provide a common currency, which is essential for value 
integration (Weber and Johnson, 2009), while intuition can be char-
acterized as “the subjective experience of a mostly non-conscious 
process that is fast, a-logical and inaccessible to consciousness that, 
dependent on exposure to the domain or problem space, is capable 
of accurately extracting probabilistic contingencies” (Lieberman 
(2000, p. 111). This process has a different (holistic) nature, and 
can be distinguished experimentally, from the rule-based, sequen-
tial decisions that are subject to capacity limitations in working 
memory (Glöckner, 2008; Glöckner and Betsch, 2008a,b). Second, 
experimental studies have indicated that conscious deliberation 
(explicitly analyzing reasons when making decisions) can have a 
disruptive effect on attitudes (Wilson and Schooler, 1991; Wilson 
et al., 1993, 1995) and that distraction – a process likely to reduce 
the contribution of the deliberation process in decision-making –   
is not always detrimental for product evaluation (Betsch et al., 
2001). For example, Betsch et al. (2001) showed that participants 
(who are simultaneously engaged in a distracting task) are able to 
differentiate good from poor shares on the basis of 75–150 numeri-
cal return values that were presented at a fast speed. Notably, this 
differentiation was possible only when the participants were probed 
using an affective cue (e.g., which share feels better) rather than 
when they were probed using an analytic one (report which of the 
shares had the highest average).
More recently, the hypothesis that the processes associated 
with intuition can facilitate decision quality has been supported 
by a series of studies by Dijksterhuis and colleagues, who pro-
posed that, in complex decisions, decision quality is enhanced 
by  setting  the  problem  aside  (from  conscious  scrutiny)  after 
the initial (conscious) encoding, or in other words, by “sleep-
ing on it” (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Bos et al., 2008; Strick et al., 2010). To 
show this they developed a decision-making paradigm that allows 
estimating an objective (but see discussion below) measure of 
decision quality and probing the impact that factors associated 
with intuition have on decision-making. The paradigm involves 
a contrast between a distraction and a “think-carefully” manipula-
tion, on participants faced with a decision between three and four 
choice alternatives, each characterized by the same set of 10 or 12 
binary attributes. For example, participants are asked to make a 
decision about their preferred choice of four cars based on a set 
of positive and negative attributes (such as good/poor mileage, 
good/poor handling, etc.). One alternative contains a majority 
(66%) of positive attributes, another contains a majority (66%) of 
negative attributes, while the other two alternatives lie in between 
(50% positive/negative). Before the information is presented, the 
participants are required to form an impression about the various 
options. After all the information has been presented the partici-
pants are separated into two groups. The deliberation (or “think-
carefully”) group is asked to think-carefully for a predetermined 
interval of time (3–7 min) about which of the cars they prefer, 
based on the information they have been given. The distraction 
group is also asked to make a decision about their preferred choice 
of car, however they are first asked to complete an anagram task 
(of the same duration as the “think” period of the deliberation 
group), whose aim is to distract the participants from conscious 
deliberation. Sometimes a third group, an immediate decision 
group is also used as a baseline.
The surprising result (from the traditional theory viewpoint; 
e.g.,  Franklin,  1772;  Edwards  and  Fasolo,  2001;  Edwards  and 
Newman, 2003) is that decision-making is enhanced in the dis-
traction group, compared to the deliberation group (or to the 
immediate one; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). This 
result, often described as the unconscious thought effect, was then 
interpreted to support the unconscious thought theory (UTT), 
which claims that unconscious incubation processes during the 
distraction interval are responsible for the enhanced performance 
compared to the conscious deliberation, which is subject to severe 
capacity limitations (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). UTT is 
related to the intuition-mode hypothesis, because one can assume 
that decisions performed in the distraction condition rely to a 
higher degree on intuitive strategies, than decisions performed 
after deliberation. Furthermore it is possible that immediate deci-
sions fall in between, with participants in this condition using a 
mix of intuitive and deliberation strategies. One difference between 
these views is that UTT further assumes the presence of goal-
directed unconscious thought during incubation (Dijksterhuis 
and Nordgren, 2006).
These results, however, have provoked vigorous debate, which 
centers on both conceptual criticism and on issues of replication. 
Examples of conceptual criticism involve the objective measure 
for decision quality (is it really the case that one option with 66% 
positive attributes is necessarily better for the participant than an 
option with 33%? Gonzalez-Vallejo et al., 2008); it is thus impor-
tant to ensure that the “best” alternative is defined relative to the 
subjective preference of the participant (as reflected by her ranking 
of the importance of the various attributes for the choice), and 
not only relative to the number of positive attributes. Further, 
there have been criticisms that center on the interpretation of the 
results: are unconscious decisions enhanced, or are the effects just 
a byproduct of interference triggered by the enforced delibera-
tion with inadequate memory? (Shanks, 2006; Payne et al., 2008; 
Lassiter et al., 2009). Consequently, it has been argued that the 
results are an artifact of setting up participants to make delibera-
tions in a situation that is of low ecological validity and of little www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 37  |  3
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relevance to real-life decision-making (Shanks, 2006; Lassiter et al., 
2009). Further, replication problems were reported in a number 
of studies, which employed very similar methods and materials 
(Acker, 2008; Calvillo and Penaloza, 2009; Newell et al., 2009; Rey 
et al., 2009; Thorsteinson and Withrow, 2009). A number of studies 
by researchers associated with other labs, however, have reported 
replications (Lerouge, 2009; Lassiter et al., 2009; see discussion 
below) as well as generalizations to other domains (Ham et al., 
2009; Ham and Van den Bos, 2010). Two recent meta-analyses have 
reported mean effect sizes of g = 0.251 in favor of unconscious 
thought when compared to conscious thought (Acker, 2008) and 
g = 0.402 in favor of unconscious thought when compared to both 
conscious thought and immediate judgments and decisions (Strick 
et al., unpublished manuscript1).
These diverging results indicate that the unconscious thought 
effect depends on subtle procedural differences and is subject to 
individual differences (Lassiter et al., 2009). Two new studies pro-
vide some possible explanations for the variability in results. First, 
Strick et al. (2010) have shown that the unconscious thought effect 
only takes place for participants that did not make their decision 
during the presentation of the material (online decisions; see also 
Lassiter et al., 2009), but rather postponed their decision for after the 
distraction manipulation (see further discussion after Experiment 
1). Second, one of the most revealing studies using this paradigm 
(Lerouge, 2009), indicated that the advantage conferred by the dis-
traction only impacts decision-making when the participants are 
induced into a holistic or configural mind-set (they are asked to form 
a global impression of each alternative) as opposed to a featural 
one (they are asked to compare individual attributes of the alterna-
tives). This is important as holistic processing is directly linked to the 
intuitive/affective system, which is thought to mediate these effects.
The aim of the present work is to further investigate the impact 
of the mind-set and of distraction manipulations on the quality of 
decision-making. Our working hypothesis is that the unconscious 
thought effect is the outcome of the processing advantage of the 
intuitive/affective mode of thought (over the conscious, capacity 
limited,  mode)  in  value  integration. Accordingly,  distraction  is 
only one type of manipulation that can engage the intuitive/affec-
tive mode. In particular, when faced with complex multi-attribute 
decisions, participants can either rely on the power of the intuitive 
system to integrate values – an ability that is consistent with a vast 
amount of literature in implicit learning (Reber, 1993; Knowlton 
et al., 1996; Lieberman, 2000; Bierman et al., 2005) – or rely on a 
conscious system, which bases the decision on the few attributes that 
are maintained in working memory. This hypothesis shares many 
common principles with the UTT theory (for example the recom-
mendation that better decisions are obtained, if ones “sleeps on it”), 
but does not need to subscribe to all the assumptions made about 
unconscious thought in UTT (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006).
Here we report the results of four experiments. The first one is a 
replication of the unconscious thought effect, with the attempt to 
ensure the validity of the subjective decision criterion. We believe 
this is important in light of the reported failed replications and 
of criticisms of the validity of the subjective decision criterion 
(Gonzalez-Vallejo et al., 2008). The second and third experiment, 
examine the impact of mode of thought manipulations on decision-
making, without a distraction manipulation. Here we reasoned that 
if the intuitive mode results in better decisions compared to the 
deliberation mode, we should be able to observe this by comparing 
the decision quality of deliberation vs. intuitive/affect manipula-
tions in immediate decisions (with no distraction). Finally, in the 
fourth experiment we combine these two methods, by using a mode 
of thought in conjunction with a distraction manipulation. This 
combination is aimed to engage the intuitive system in a more 
efficient way. Further, we pose the following question (Experiments 
3 and 4): Can we show that the intuitive/affective mode of thought 
improves decision quality in a situation that attempts to enhance 
the ecological validity of the decision?
ExpErImEnt 1: a rEplIcatIon of thE unconscIous 
thought EffEct
The experiment used the unconscious thought paradigm with one 
important modification. Before being presented with the informa-
tion about the four choice alternatives, each participant ranked the 
set of attributes on which the alternative choices were composed. 
These ranks were then used, via a computer program, to create 
alternatives for each participant, that ensured one of the alternatives 
(labeled here as A) was the best option for that participant; while 
another alternative (D) was the worst option for that participant 
(the other two options fell in between).
mEthod
Participants
Fifty-two participants (33 female) took part in this experiment. 
Twenty-four of them were from Birkbeck College (London; age-
range 20–50) and 28 from Tel-Aviv University (TAU; age-range 
20–30). The Birkbeck participants were tested in English while the 
Tel-Aviv participants were tested in Hebrew (the same materials 
were used and translated into Hebrew). In both groups, the par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to the think-carefully (N = 27) 
or the distraction (N = 25) conditions, and to a car or holiday 
problem (see below). They were paid for their participation (£5 
or NIS25, respectively).
Materials
The choice materials were either four cars or four holiday packages, 
composed of 12 attributes each. The car attributes were taken from 
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), and the holiday attributes were designed 
for this experiment (see Appendix). For both of the choice materi-
als, the way in which the alternatives were constructed is illustrated 
in Table 1.
Table 1 | Positive and negative attributes of alternatives in Experiment 1.
Alternative  No. of positive  No. negative  Rank of positive 
  attributes  attributes  attributes
A  8  4  1–8
B  8  4  1, 3–4, 6–7 , 9–10, 12
C  6  6  1–6
D  5  7  2, 5, 7 , 8, 11 1www.unconsciouslab.com/publications/Paper_Meta.docFrontiers in Psychology  | Cognitive Science    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 37  |  4
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tives. One variable that can be extracted from these ratings is the 
  differentiation, computed as the rating difference: A–D. The UTT 
hypothesis predicts that the number of participants choosing the 
“best” option (A) will be higher for the distraction group. Second, 
the UTT hypothesis predicts an interaction in the rating between 
the groups and value given to the best, middle, and worse alter-
native, so that the distraction group should have a higher differ-
entiation. Despite these predictions, we use here two-tail tests of 
significance, in order to maintain a cautious interpretation, in light 
of failed replication reports (Acker, 2008).
rEsults
As there were no differences (in either choice or differentiation 
scores) between the participants who performed the task with cars 
and those who performed it with holidays, the results are collapsed 
across the two types of material.
Choice
The number of participants rating each option highest, in each of 
the two groups, is reported in Table 2. The fraction of participants 
who “choose” option-A (rather than any other option) was higher 
in the distraction group, compared with the think-carefully group 
(χ2 (1) = 7.65, p < 0.01).
Differentiation
The mean evaluations of the two groups for each of the four alter-
natives are shown in Figure 1.
We subjected this data to a 2 (group) × 3 [quality: A, (B + C)/2, 
D], ANOVA. The results indicated a highly significant main effect 
of quality F(1,50) = 42.3, p < 0.001, and an interaction between 
group and quality, which approaches, but does not reach signifi-
cance [F(1,50) = 3.6; p = 0.06]. Participants gave higher ratings to 
Thus option-A had 8 (out of 12) positive attributes, which were 
the attributes ranked by the participant as the most important 
to them. Option-B also had eight positive attributes, but these 
attributes had lower rankings. Option-C had only six positive 
attributes but these attributes, similar to A, were the highest rank-
ing attributes. The worst option was D, which had only five positive 
attributes, and those were also attributes with lower rankings, com-
pared to A (see Table 1). In the following we consider option-A as 
the best, options B and C (as middle options; we have no reason to 
predict that one is better than the other), and option-D as the worse.
Procedure
Stage-I.  The  experiment  was  described  as  an  experiment  on 
  decision-making.  Participants  were  asked  to  rank  the  various 
attributes of a car (or holiday package) in order of importance to 
them. The ranks were solicited by a computer program, which also 
registered them and used them online to construct the material for 
Stage-II. For example, a participant could indicate that the most 
important attribute for a holiday package is the “weather-forecast,” 
and the second one, the “quality of beaches,” etc. (see Appendix for 
the List of Attributes).
Stage-II. Participants were asked to form an overall impression 
about the four cars/holiday packages and were then presented with 
information about the alternatives. The order was randomized 
with  regards  to  all  combinations  of  alternative  and  attributes 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) and the pace of presentation was 4 s per 
item (car and attribute combination). The alternatives were created 
as described above on the basis of the ranks that the participant gave 
in Stage-I. For example, for a participant who ranked “weather” as 
the most important attribute for a holiday package, the good option 
(A) was characterized by “good weather,” as well as by positive 
attributes on the eight attributes the participant ranked highest; 
while the bad option (D) was characterized by “bad weather,” and by 
negative attributes on six other attributes (see Table 1). The actual 
label (A–D), in which the four alternatives were presented to each 
participant was also randomized by the software.
Stage-III. Participants were divided into Think and Distraction 
groups. The think-group participants were told that they have to 
“think-carefully” for 3 min about which option they think is the 
best based on the information they were presented with. In contrast, 
the distraction group participants were asked to solve anagrams 
of animals for 3 min, prior to deciding on their preferred option. 
The anagrams (words with a rearranged order of letters, e.g., dbri 
for target “bird”) were presented on paper.
Stage-IV. All participants were asked to enter a rating for each of the 
four alternatives on a scale (1–10). The participants were instructed 
to first decide, which of the alternatives they prefer most and to 
give the highest rating to that alternative. Thus one could not enter 
equal ratings for the two most preferred alternatives.
Dependent variables and statistical tests
The  dependent  variables  are  the  number  of  participants  that 
rated the “good” alternative (A) highest (labeled here as “choice”) 
and the ratings given to the best, middle and the worst alterna-
Table 2 | Number of participants rating each option highest, in each of 
the two groups.
Group\  alternative  A  B  C  D  Total 
          participants
Think-carefully  8  10  7  2  27
Distraction  17  5  3  0  25
FiGuRE 1 | Mean evaluations for the four alternatives in the two groups 
(A is best option, D is worst).www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 37  |  5
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tion (based on Epstein’s CEST theory; Epstein, 1994), previously 
used to trigger an analytic/deliberation vs. experiential/intuitive 
mind-set (Krauss et al., 2004). It is predicted that with such a mind-
set manipulation, which centers on the distinction between rule-
based and emotional/affective processing, differences in decision 
quality in favor of the intuitive group will be obtained even in the 
immediate decisions.
mEthod
Participants
Thirty-six participants (19 female; age-range: 20–30) from TAU 
took part in this experiment. They were randomly assigned to the 
affect and analytic groups. Each group consisted of N = 18 partici-
pants. The TAU student participants, recruited by the experiment-
ers, volunteered to take part in a study of decision-making prior to 
being exposed to any decision-making lectures.
Materials
The decision materials were the same as reported in Dijksterhuis 
et al. (2006). They consisted of four fictitious car alternatives each 
composed of the same 12 binary (good/bad) attributes. One alter-
native (A) was composed of 66% positive attributes; two alterna-
tives contained 50% positive attributes while one of them (D) had 
only 33% positive attributes.
Procedure
The  first  stage  of  the  experiment  consisted  of  the  mind-set 
manipulation, which took 3 min. The participants in the analytic 
group received a sheet of mathematical queries (e.g., multiplica-
tions; additions; subtractions; raising to power-two; and frac-
tions) with instructions to calculate the results. The participants 
were told to calculate as many of the queries that they could 
within the 3-min interval, and were allowed to skip questions. 
They were also provided with a pen and pad of paper to complete 
the calculations. Participants in the experiential/affective group 
were given a task that required them to express their current 
emotional state (Krauss et al., 2004). Specifically, participants 
were told that “feelings and attitudes can be expressed through a 
number of measures including creative expression. We would like 
you to draw a picture that describes your gut-level feelings about 
your emotional state right now.” This manipulation is motivated 
by the association of the intuitive system with affect (Damasio, 
1994; Epstein, 1994). Participants were given a pack of colored 
crayons to draw with for an interval of 3 min. Participants in 
both groups, were told that the task will not be evaluated and, 
if they prefer, they can take the math/drawing sheet with them. 
This was done to minimize any stress that could be triggered by 
the mind-set manipulation.
In the second stage, all the participants were informed that they 
would be presented with information about four cars, which a 
hypothetical person views in order to choose a new car. Then the 48 
pieces of information were presented (random order, not blocked) 
at a pace of 8 s per item (car and attribute combination). In the 
final stage the participants were asked to evaluate each of the four 
cars and indicate their preference for each, by ticking a location 
on four horizontal lines (one for each alternative), presented to 
them on paper. Previous research has indicated that this kind of 
the better options, indicating that the ratings reflect the subjective 
importance of the attributes (entered by the participants) and the 
composition of the alternatives (Table 1). Furthermore, this dis-
crimination tended to be larger for the distraction group; the A–D 
evaluation of the distraction group was (Mean = 2.96, SD = 2.64), 
while that of the think-carefully group was [Mean = 1.62; SD = 2.46; 
t(50) = 2.42, p = 0.06].
dIscussIon
While the ratings of the alternatives showed only marginally signifi-
cant group differences in favor of the distractor group, the fraction 
of choices in favor of the best-alternative was highly significant, con-
sistent with the UTT hypothesis (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis 
et  al.,  2006).  One  possible  criticism  of  this    interpretation  is 
that the participants in the distraction group avoided the bad- 
alternative D, because they made use of a lexicographic strategy –   
choosing on the basis of the most important attribute – which 
puts D at a disadvantage (it has a low value on the most important 
attribute). This interpretation, however, is unlikely, in light of the 
choice results in Table 2, which show that only two of the partici-
pants (in the think-carefully group), actually chose the poor option-
D. Eliminating these two participants from the analysis (focusing 
thus on choices of A vs. B and C), shows that the advantage of 
the distraction group remains significant [χ2 (1) = 6.48, p < 0.02]. 
One novel feature of this experiment is the fact that, although the 
alternatives were not arranged in a strict domination relation (one 
option better than another on a subset of attributes and equal to 
it in all the others, and thus one cannot simplify the problem by 
ignoring the common attributes), they were such that, given the 
ranking of the attributes by each participant, option-A was best and 
option-D was the worst for that participant. Moreover, this subjec-
tive order of preference is not subject to a psychological   dissonance 
criticism: the distortion of the ranking of attributes, had it been 
performed following the decision.
Note, however, that these results can also be accounted for, using 
an intuition/affective hypothesis. Accordingly, participants make 
use of a mixture of intuitive/affect and deliberation strategies in 
immediate decisions, and these strategy differences are amplified 
as a result of the distraction/think-carefully manipulation; think-
carefully participants being more likely to rely on remembered 
attributes, while distraction participants more likely to rely on the 
integrated values (intuition as a process of implicit integration of 
values). The intuitive/affective hypothesis can also be tested with 
manipulations that do not require a post-acquisition distraction/
think-aloud manipulation, but rather via mind-set manipulations 
in immediate decision-making. In our second experiment, we set 
out to further examine the effect of mind-set on complex multi-
attribute decision-making, using an affect manipulation that was 
designed to trigger a distinction between the intuitive/experiential 
and the rational/analytic modes of decision-making.
ExpErImEnt 2: affEctIvE vs. analytIcal mInd-sEts
The second experiment presented participants with an immediate 
decision (without time pressure) between multi-attribute alter-
natives (cars) using the same materials previously employed by 
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006). The key difference is that the distraction/
think-carefully manipulation was replaced by a mind-set manipula-Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognitive Science    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 37  |  6
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– which   measures the capacity of working memory. Two groups 
of 10 (two females) participants were tested. The results indicate 
no effect of our mind-set manipulation on reading-span scores. 
The average scores were 2.9 (SD = 0.54) for the math-group and 3 
(SD = 0.77) for the drawing group (p > 0.75). As the reading-span 
measures the working memory capacity, this makes an interpreta-
tion based on a generalized fatigue effect less likely and supports 
the interpretation that the mind-set effect is due to the advantage 
of the affective over the analytic mind-set in complex decisions.
This result supports the hypothesis that the affective/intuitive 
system is superior in value integration, compared with the delibera-
tion, rule-based system, and is not subject to criticisms that have 
been raised against the unconscious thought effect, such as, that it 
reflects interference in the think-carefully condition (rather than 
better processing for the unconscious decision). The aim of the 
next experiment is to use a different manipulation that is asso-
ciated with the intuitive–affective system (Epstein, 1994). While 
in Experiment 2 the manipulation involved the engagement of 
an affective/emotional mode of thought implicitly (via an unre-
lated task), in Experiment 3 we used an explicit manipulation (via 
instructions) to induce an intuitive mode of thought (Epstein, 1994; 
Lieberman, 2000; Ferreira et al., 2006). If intuition-instructions can 
make participants tap into such processes one should also expect 
an effect on decision quality in immediate decisions, as suggested 
by studies, in which participants were asked to reflect on, or justify 
the reason for their preference, showing that deliberation on reasons 
can bias decision-making (Wilson and Schooler, 1991; Wilson et al., 
1993, 1995; Levine et al., 1996).
A second aim in the next two experiments was to address the 
ecological criticism often raised against UTT, which points out 
that in many of these studies, participants are presented with very 
fragmented information (48 pieces of information in a randomized 
order) and have no further access to that information during the 
deliberation stage. It can then be argued that such situations are 
hardly representative (and of little relevance) to real-life decisions 
(Shanks, 2006). In our next two experiments we attempted to 
modify the mode in which the information is presented so that it 
resembled more real-life choice situations. In both experiments, the 
main manipulation involved deliberation vs. mind-set instructions.
ExpErImEnt 3: IntuItIvE vs. analytIc mInd-sEts
A common situation in complex decision-making is that one 
examines different aspects of the information about a choice 
several times. Consider, for example, a person who struggles to 
decide which of three available apartments to purchase. It would 
be likely that the person would visit the three apartments a few 
times, each time paying more attention to other aspects, and 
that this information will then be integrated toward a decision. 
Furthermore, the information is unlikely to be fragmented, as 
was the case in our previous two experiments. To mimic such a 
situation, in these two experiments we presented the information 
about choosing a flatmate (a topic that is ecological for most of 
our participants who are undergraduate students) in blocks of 
four attributes (each block is analogous to a visit to one apart-
ment). This means that the participants are shown a slide with 
four attributes of flatmate A for 12 s, before being shown a slide 
with the same four attributes for flatmate B (again 12 s) and then 
  (analog) response mode is more sensitive than numeric evaluations 
for   tapping into an individual’s intuitive processes (Betsch et al., 
2001). Two dependent measures were examined: the “choice” frac-
tion for the best-alternative (defined by the option that received the 
highest rating) and the differentiation scores (A–D).
rEsults
Manipulations
All the participants were able to carry out the mind-set manipu-
lations without difficulty. In particular, all participants showed 
high motivation and good compliance with the mode of thought 
manipulation  (drawing  or  making  calculations;  none  of  them 
reported difficulties).
Choice fraction
The percent of participants “choosing” each option, in each of the 
two groups is reported in Table 3 for a subset of the participants 
(N = 12 participants in the affect group and N = 13 participants 
in the analytic group)1.
The percent of participants who gave option-A (the “good car”) 
the highest rank compared to the other cars, was higher for the 
intuition group (83%) when compared with the analytic group 
(30%; χ2 (1) = 7, p < 0.01).
Differentiation
The  differentiation  scores  were  higher  in  the  affect  group 
(Mean  =  22.5,  SD  =  10.0)  when  compared  with  the  analytic 
group (Mean = 12.2; SD = 14.7). The difference was significant 
[t(35) = 2.47; p = 0.02; two-tailed].
dIscussIon
The results of this experiment demonstrate that when participants 
were induced into an affective mind-set, by drawing a picture that 
corresponded to their current emotional state, they performed 
better  on  value  integration  across  attributes  than  participants 
induced into a rational/analytic mind-set (as a result of solving 
math problems). One potential criticism to this conclusion is that 
this difference is the result of fatigue, triggered by the pre-decision 
task, higher for the math-calculations, than for the drawing. We 
believe this to be unlikely, as the performance in the math task was 
de-emphasized (participants were told they can take the drawing/
math sheet with them). However, in order to verify that the result 
is not due to a fatigue artifact we ran a control test, in which the 
same mind-set manipulation was done before a task that is not deci-
sion-related – the reading-span (Daneman and Carepenter, 1980) 
Table 3 | Number of participants that selected each option, in the two 
groups.
Group/alternative  A  B  C  D
Analytic group   4  4  3  2
Intuitive group   10  0  1  1
1This is due to the fact that the response forms of the few participants were mista-
kenly lost, after having registered the differentiation score, which was the initial 
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were too important and would therefore have a disproportionate 
impact (in comparison to the other attributes) on the decision. One 
of the flatmates (the best option, A) was composed of 66% positive 
attributes (8 out of 12), the second flatmate (B) was composed of 
50% positive attributes while the third flatmate (C) was composed 
of 33% positive attributes. A second pilot on 17 participants (asked 
to give weights to the attributes, in the context of choosing a flat-
mate, on a scale of 1–9) confirmed that the weighted utility was 
highest for A (Mean = 50.5, SD = 7.9), middle for B (Mean = 39.4; 
SD = 6.3) and lowest for C (Mean = 25.3; SD = 4.0); all differences 
are significant (ps < 0.001).
Procedure
Participants were first given instructions to induce intuitive or 
analytic mind-sets (see Ferreira et al., 2006, Experiment 1 for a 
similar manipulation). Participants in the intuitive conditions were 
told that “Research has shown that the best decisions are the ones 
made using intuition” and were encouraged to base their evaluation 
on their “GUT-FEELING” and to make a distinction between the 
overall attractiveness of each flatmate. They were told that they 
will be given as much time as needed to make an evaluation, but 
warned that thinking too long does not help (thus better to use gut-
feeling). Participants in the analytical group were told that “Research 
has shown that the best decisions are the ones made using logic and 
rational thought” and were encouraged to think-carefully and logi-
cally about the three flatmates and about the reasons to prefer one 
flatmate to another one (see Appendix for detailed instructions). 
Following the mind-set instruction the information about the three 
flatmates was presented (Figure 2).
In order to facilitate the participant’s ability to bind the attributes 
of each flatmate and differentiate them from that of the other flat-
mates, the attributes of each flatmate were shown in a different 
color. The order of the alternatives in a cycle was always, A/B/C, 
for flatmate C (Figure 2). Following this cycle, two new cycles 
were presented, with a new set of four attributes each, which sum 
to a sequence of nine slides, with a total of 12 attributes for each 
of the three flatmates. We reasoned that faced with this type of 
presentation, participants will have the choice of focusing their 
decision on value integration within an alternative (a holistic 
decision) or on comparisons of attributes between alternatives 
(a featural decision; Lerouge, 2009); which they can do on the 
basis of information in working memory. Instead of the drawing/
emotional manipulation, here we used a more direct manipula-
tion. Participants were instructed to rely either on their intui-
tion (gut-feeling) or on their reasons (which they may need to 
explain). Based on our previous experiment and the association 
between system-I with both affective processing and intuition 
(Epstein, 1994), as well as on the basis of previous studies that 
demonstrated negative effects of over-thinking on the quality 
of preference (Wilson and Schooler, 1991; Wilson et al., 1993) 
we predict that the choice and the differentiation scores will be 
higher for the intuitive group, who is more likely to evaluate the 
flatmates holistically (i.e., integrate across attributes) rather than 
on the basis of comparisons of attributes from working memory.
mEthod
Participants
Twenty-four participants (11 female; age-range 21–41) took part 
in Experiment 3. Most were students at Birkbeck or UCL and were 
paid 5£ for participation in the experiment. The participants were 
randomly assigned to the two mind-set conditions (12 to each).
Materials
The choice alternatives consisted of three flatmates, which were 
composed of a set of 12 binary attributes (sense of humor, tidiness, 
etc.; see Appendix). Pilot testing was used to exclude attributes that 
FiGuRE 2 | Presentation of the choice material in Experiments 3 and 4: the 
first of three cycles, in which the information about the flatmates is 
presented. The information is presented, with a sequence of slides, each slide 
containing four attributes about one flatmate and is shown for 12 s. Each cycle 
starts with four attributes of flatmate A, followed by four attributes of flatmate B, 
and last four attributes of flatmate C; the fourth box, Anagram/Think, only applies 
to Experiment 4. Three cycles of slides are presented, corresponding to a total of 
12 attributes for each flatmate.Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognitive Science    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 37  |  8
Usher et al.  Intuition in complex decisions
manipulation, which may often happen in the standard uncon-
scious thought experiments. Finally, while the inter-spacing of 
think-intervals during the acquisition of decision information, 
might trigger anchoring and adjustment mechanisms, resulting 
in less holistic reasoning (Pennington and Hastie, 1992), the inter-
spacing of anagram reasoning, could facilitate holistic processing 
and integration.
mEthod
Participants
Twenty-nine participants from the Interdisciplinary center (IDC) 
Herzliya (23 female; age-range 20–30) took part in Experiment 4. 
They were randomly assigned to the two mind-set conditions and 
received credit for their participation.
Materials
Same as for Experiment 3.
Procedure
The mind-set instructions and the presentation of the informa-
tion were the same as in Experiment 3 (see Appendix), the only 
difference being the time windows (every cycle of 12 items; see 
Figure 2), in which the participants are asked to reason about the 
flatmate (analytic group) or to solve anagrams (intuitive group). 
The reasoning (analytic group), was prompted by presenting 
three queries asking for reasons for liking/disliking each flatmate; 
participants could proceed to the next query (or next stage in the 
experiment) only when they typed a response. They were allowed 
to type “don’t know” if they could not answer (those answers 
were coded as “incorrect”). This procedure was repeated at the 
end of each presentation cycle and was not time limited. The 
intuitive group were asked to solve three anagrams, following 
each three-slide presentation cycle. The anagram task was not 
time limited. Each anagram was presented on the screen until 
the participant typed a response (“don’t know responses were 
allowed and were coded as “incorrect”). Finally, as in Experiment 
3, the participants were required to enter a rating (on a scale 
1–10) for each of the flatmates.
rEsults
Anagram and Reasoning tasks
In both manipulations the participants showed a high accuracy in 
their ability to answer queries about the flatmates (96%) and in 
their ability to solve the anagrams (89%). The average time that 
participants in the analytical condition took to answer each query 
about liking or disliking the flatmates was 22.5 s (SD = 15.4), i.e., 
about 1 min per cycle. The average time that participants in the 
intuitive condition took to solve each anagram was 22.7 (SD = 39), 
i.e., also about 1 min per cycle.
Decision Quality
There was a significant difference in the fraction of partici-
pants who gave the good alternative, A, the highest rating in 
the two conditions (15/15 in the intuitive condition, 9/14 in 
the analytical condition). This difference reached significance 
[χ2 (1) = 6.47; p = 0.01]. There was also a significant differ-
ence in the   differentiation scores between the two groups in 
however, the relation between the good/middle/bad and A/B/C was 
counterbalanced. Finally, the participants were required to enter a 
rating (on a scale 1–10) for each of the flatmates.
rEsults and dIscussIon
There were no significant differences in the fraction of partici-
pants who rated the good alternative highest in the two condi-
tions (7/12 in both). However, the differentiation scores (A–C), 
were significantly larger than zero, only for the intuitive group 
[Mean = 2.42; SD = 2.47; t(11) = 3.4, p < 0.01]. The differentia-
tion scores of the analytic group were not significantly differ-
ent from zero [Mean = 0.58; SD = 2.84; t(11) = 0.71, p = 0.58], 
and they were smaller than for the intuitive group [t(22) = 1.69; 
p < 0.05; one-tail]. Although only significant at a one-tail level, 
this result is consistent with our prediction of an advantage 
in favor of the intuitive mind-set group (see also Wilson and 
Schooler, 1991; Wilson et al., 1993, 1995). The relatively small 
effect is due to the large individual differences, suggesting that the 
instruction manipulations may not have been effective enough 
for all participants.
The aim of the fourth experiment was to strengthen the manipu-
lation, and at the same time to increase the ecological validity to 
that of real-life decisions. To do this, we combined the mind-set 
manipulation with a distractor task (Lerouge, 2009). The aim of was 
to test if combining the two types of manipulation in an integrated 
task results in enhanced decision quality.
ExpErImEnt 4: dIstractIon and IntuItIon togEthEr
Experiment  4  was  identical  to  Experiment  3,  except  that  a 
  distraction/think manipulation was added in combination with 
the mind-set instruction (Figure 2). This manipulation was chosen 
so as to maximize the difference between the intuitive vs. analytic 
modes of thought. For the participants in the analytic condition, 
this manipulation involved analyzing the reasons for liking or 
disliking each of the three flatmates. For the participants in the 
intuitive condition, the manipulation involved solving anagrams. 
Note that the aim was not to carry out a 2 × 2 examination of 
instructions with distraction-type, but rather to contrasts the 
extreme modes of thought: intuitive vs. conscious deliberation, 
under the assumption that while analyzing would strengthen the 
analytic instruction mind-set, the anagrams will strengthen the 
intuitive mind-set. Furthermore, the design differs from the stand-
ard think-aloud/anagram paradigm (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), in 
which the manipulation is only applied at the end of the infor-
mation acquisition (when some of the participants may already 
have made a decision). Here the manipulation was inter-spaced 
with the acquisition itself. Instead of 3 min at the end, it includes 
three intervals of about 1 min, after each cycle of presentation 
(see Figure 2).
There  are  few  additional  motivations  for  inter-spacing  the 
acquisition and think/distraction intervals. First, we believe that 
this procedure is more similar to real-life decision situations, in 
which the acquisition of information and the decision time are 
proceeding in parallel, allowing the participants a better oppor-
tunity to make use of the information (not yet forgotten) during 
the think/distraction intervals. Second, this procedure reduces the 
likelihood that participants decide before they are exposed to the www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 37  |  9
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induced into affective or intuitive mind-sets compared with the 
groups induced into deliberation-analytic mind-sets. Finally, in 
Experiment 4, we combined the mind-set (intuitive–analytic) 
and the   distraction manipulation into an integral task. Here 
the distraction and the think-intervals were interspersed with 
the presentation of the material, allowing the participants a 
better opportunity to integrate values or to recollect them. The 
results favored the intuitive–distraction group compared with 
the analytic-  deliberation group.
Given the fact that some of the criticism against the UTT is based 
on failed replications (Acker, 2008, but see Strick et al., unpub-
lished manuscript2), the results of our first experiment provide 
some support for the UTT theory (Boss et al., 2008; Dijksterhuis 
and Nordgren, 2006). Nevertheless, we believe that further research 
is needed in order to decide whether unconscious thought during 
a distractor interval is the critical process that contributes to the 
unconscious thought, and it is not our aim to evaluate this posi-
tion here. We believe that one should keep an open mind toward 
this possibility, which is supported by some independent research 
on incubation in insight problems (Zhong et al., 2008), but which 
faces a number serious challenges. First, as recently shown by Payne 
et al. (2008), participants in a think-condition can outperform 
participants in distractor conditions, if the interval of the think-
period is self-paced rather than fixed3. Second, the fact that many 
studies have failed to replicate the results, indicate that the effect 
is highly sensitive to experimental conditions (e.g., instructions) 
and to individual differences (Lassiter et al., 2009; but see Strick 
et al., 2010). Part of the difficulty may be related to the nature of 
the distraction/think paradigm, which is such that the conscious/
unconscious manipulation is applied only after the participants 
have been exposed to the choice material, by which time partici-
pants could already have formed a decision.
Unlike UTT, which makes a somewhat stronger claim and has 
attracted considerable debate, the view that the intuitive–affective 
system is critical for fast value integration is consistent with the 
wider literature that includes neuropsychological (Damasio, 1994; 
Lieberman, 2000; Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Fellows 2006; Weller 
et al., 2007) and experimental methods (Wilson and Schooler, 1991; 
Wilson et al., 1993, 1995; Betsch, et al., 2001; Bierman et al., 2005). 
According to this view, distraction is only one type of manipulation, 
which together (or in combination) with mind-set can enhance 
decision quality by making participants use affective–intuitive strat-
egies. Results consistent with this hypothesis were also obtained by 
Wilson and colleagues using a different experimental paradigm 
with an indirect measure of decision quality (Wilson and Schooler, 
1991; Wilson et al., 1993). For example, Wilson and Schooler (1991) 
found that participants who analyzed their reasons for liking differ-
ent strawberry jams made preference decisions that corresponded 
less well with those of experts than did those of participants who did 
not analyze the reasons for their attitudes. In another experiment 
(Wilson et al., 1993), people who did, or did not, analyze the reasons 
favor of the intuitive–distraction group (Mean = 2.8, SD = 1.74 
vs. Mean = 1.57, SD = 1.22). This difference was significant 
[t(27) = 2.18, p < 0.05].
dIscussIon
The results of Experiment 4 appear to have succeeded in strength-
ening  the  manipulation  by  combining  the  intuitive/analytic 
instructions with a distraction/think manipulation. This resulted 
in a significant difference in both the choice and the differentia-
tion scores. As the two Experiments (3 and 4) were performed on 
different participants (London vs Tel-Aviv, though they were both 
with undergraduate students and the same materials were used), 
further research is needed to establish whether the distraction 
manipulation contributes to the intuitive advantage beyond what 
is obtained with intuitive/analytic instructions alone. The impor-
tant result, however, is that in both experiments an advantage in 
favor of the intuitive mode of thought was demonstrated in a 
complex decision-making task that attempted to maintain aspects 
of ecological validity. These results are consistent both with the 
UTT, according to which incubation processes take place during 
the solution of the anagrams, and with the intuitive–  affective 
hypothesis, according to which both the instructions and the 
anagram distraction push participants to rely more on intuitive 
mind-sets.
One  additional  point  is  important  to  make  in  relation  to 
Experiment 4. The results of this experiment are remarkable given 
that the participants in the analytic-deliberation group had actually 
more useful time to deliberate on their decisions compared to the 
participants in the intuitive-anagram group. Unlike in the previ-
ous studies with the unconscious thought paradigm, which has 
been criticized for placing the participants in the think-carefully 
condition in a situation that is not helpful for decision-making 
(because most of the information is forgotten by the time they 
are given time to think), here the “thinking” intervals are intro-
duced during the presentation of the material in a way that one 
may expect to help them integrate the information. The fact that 
the same intervals, filled with anagram activity, had a larger effect 
on the differentiation scores, provides some additional support to 
the UTT and suggests that it may have more ecological relevance 
than previously thought. This is consistent with the suggestion that 
unconscious thought during distraction intervals can play a role 
in organizing the information in the unconscious thought experi-
ments (Strick et al., 2010).
gEnEral dIscussIon
The four experiments reported here provide support for the 
claim that intuitive–affective strategies can outperform delib-
eration/analytic strategies in value integration, an operation 
that is critical for complex decision-making. To summarize, 
in Experiment 1 we obtained a replication of the unconscious 
thought effect (in both choice and differentiation scores) using a 
distraction manipulation (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, et al., 
2006) with alternatives that were constructed, for each partici-
pant, with a definite order of subjective quality. In Experiment 
2 and 3 we used a mind-set manipulation (implicit-affective in 
Experiment 2 and explicit-intuition in Experiment 3) without a 
distraction. The results were in favor of the groups which were 
2www.unconsciouslab.com/publications/Paper_Meta.doc
3The  experiment,  however,  was  carried  out  with  alternatives  characterized  by 
  numerical values, and it remains to be seen if this effect persists with qualitative 
attributes that may be more natural for the intuitive or unconscious thought system 
(Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006; Dijksterhuis et al., 2009).Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognitive Science    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 37  |  10
Usher et al.  Intuition in complex decisions
Lets us illustrate this for the type of decisions discussed here. When 
presented with few alternatives, each characterized by many attributes, 
system-2 would play the role of sequentially   inspecting attributes and 
relations (this car is more economical than the other), while system-1 
has the function of generating an affective integration of the val-
ues. A model based on this idea, was recently presented by Glöckner 
and  Betsch  (2008b),  who  have  further  developed  the  coherency 
and constraint-satisfaction theories of decision-making (Thagard, 
1989; Holyoak and Simon, 1999). According to Glöckner and Betsch 
(2008b), system-2 has the role of searching for information relevant to 
the decision, when the present information does not allow the intuitive 
system (characterized as a parallel constraint-satisfaction network) to 
reach a decision with enough confidence. This model, illustrates the 
idea that optimal decisions require a coordinated interaction of the 
two-systems: repeated examination of the material (or deliberation on 
the various features) allows the intuitive system a better opportunity 
to integrate (learning increases with the number of presentations)5. 
This learning process, however, has limitations. The potential down-
side of an excessive reliance on the deliberation system is that one 
may get trapped into loops: A is better because of reason-1, but B is 
better because of reason-2, and so on. This can then lead to a reliance 
on conscious lexicographic heuristics that totally bypass the intuitive 
system and its ability to integrate values explaining effects of the type 
reported here and in other studies. These studies demonstrated that 
excessive deliberation (on reasons) distorts decisions (Wilson and 
Schooler, 1991; Wilson et al., 1995), as well as the decision deficits of 
patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Bechara 
et al., 1997; Bechara and Damasio, 2005).
The two system theory has implications for how to enhance 
decision-  making in real-life situations. It suggests that, after having 
deliberated about a decision for as long as one feels comfortable, it 
does make sense to put it aside, or as suggested by Dijsksterhuis, to 
“sleep on it,” in order to allow ourselves the opportunity to tap into 
the integrated value computed by the intuitive/  affective (or uncon-
scious) system. We believe that, independent of the theoretical expla-
nation (unconscious thought or intuition) our results (in particular 
Experiment 4) provide evidence for this conclusion, although at this 
stage, it should be taken with caution. There are surely factors that can 
bias the affective system in ways irrelevant to the decision situation 
(Winkielman et al., 1997; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; Finucane 
et al., 2000; Greene et al., 2001; Au et al., 2003), so that the optimal deci-
sion strategy is likely to depend on a variety of contingencies. Future 
work that examines objective measures of decision quality in real-
life problems, in which attributes are not explicit (e.g., Dijksterhuis 
et al., 2009), and which takes into account individual differences, are 
important to better understand how to facilitate decision-making.
acknowlEdgmEnts
We wish to thank Jyoti Palha for preparing and testing participants 
in Experiment 1, Eldad Shochat and Efrat Eshar for their part in 
preparing materials and testing in Experiment 2, Henk Haarmann 
and Andrei Teodorecu for a critical reading and helpful discus-
sions, to Jonathan Baron for comments on a previous version of 
the manuscript and David Shanks for suggesting the need for an 
affect mind-set manipulation.
why they liked five different posters were given an opportunity to 
select one of the posters to take home. When they were contacted 
a few weeks later, reasoners were less satisfied with their choices 
than were non-reasoners.
The hypothesis that affect and intuition mind-sets can enhance 
decision quality is consistent with the two-system theory (Epstein, 
1994; Sloman, 1996; Evans, 2003, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Ferreira 
et al., 2006; Kahneman and Frederick, 2007) which has recently 
been subject to vigorous criticism (Keren and Schul, 2009). In the 
following we briefly address this challenge and then we discuss a 
number of implications for two issues of broad general interest. 
The first one is conceptual and it involves the complimentary roles 
of the rational and the intuitive systems in decision-making. The 
second involves implications for enhancing decision-making in 
real-life situations.
The essence of the Keren and Schul criticism of the two-system 
theory can be captured by the following objections: (i) lack of 
consistency and clarity on what the properties of the systems are 
(different authors use different properties); (ii) are the proper-
ties of the systems well aligned in all tasks?; (iii) are the systems 
isolable?; and (iv) can the evidence used to support the theory be 
accounted for by shifting decision criteria within a single cogni-
tive system? As the authors state, the criticism is not against a two 
process (or mode of thought) approach, nor is it a plea for the 
rejection of the two-system theory, but rather it is a request for 
clarity (p. 547). We believe this is an important challenge, which 
we wish to address.
The view we favor (Damasio, 1994; Lieberman, 2000; Ferreira 
et al., 2006) is a milder version of the two-system theory, which 
sees the systems as interacting rather than as totally isolated during 
normal decision-making. We believe there is strong converging 
evidence to suggest that there are different brain mechanisms that 
specialize in the affective integration or implicit learning of this 
type of information resulting in affective value and mediated by 
dopamine (system-1), as opposed to brain mechanisms (system-2) 
that specialize in sequential analysis of decision aspects (Lieberman, 
2000; Greene et al., 2001; Lieberman et al., 2004; Bechara and 
Damasio, 2005; De Martino et al., 2006; for review see, Weber and 
Johnson, 2009). While these two mechanisms interact in normal 
decision-making, each of them can in principle be used to make 
decisions, though (as patients studies show) not very efficient ones. 
Furthermore, there is no reason to exclude additional systems (or 
subsystems) that have some mixed properties: e.g., spreading acti-
vation processes in the semantic system, which share the parallel 
type of process with the first system but not its affective value based 
processing
4. Nevertheless, we believe that it is meaningful (and 
coherent) to focus on the following main properties and func-
tions of the two extreme systems: system-1 (intuition) is parallel, 
extracts gist (holistic), and results in affective states, which are open 
to phenomenological awareness (Block, 2007) in their end result 
but not in their operation (or stages). While, in contrast, system-2 
(deliberation) is sequential, rule-based (e.g., lexicographic), and 
has access to the stages of processing.
4This is, in fact consistent, with the two-system theory as presented by Kahneman 
(2003), which envisages of the intuition system to share properties with both the 
perceptual system and the controlled cognitive system.
5If in addition, we assume that deliberation system will inspect more often features 
that are more important, this could contribute to subjective weighting.www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 37  |  11
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appEndIx
attrIbutEs for holIday-altErnatIvEs (ExpErImEnt 1)
•	 Good/bad	whether
•	 Friendly/not	friendly	staff
•	 Easy/not	easy	access
•	 Variety	of	activities	(limited)
•	 Nice/limited	room	view
•	 Many/few	near	restaurants
•	 Breakfast	(not)	included
•	 Many/no	proximal	shops
•	 Rooms	are	(not)	air-conditioned
•	 There	is	(no)	TV	in	the	room
•	 (No)	beautiful	beaches
•	 Small/spacious	rooms
See Dijksterhuis et al., 2006, for attributes of car-materials.
flatmatE matErIal (ExpErImEnts 3 and 4)
Flatmate A
•	 Has	good	grades	in	school
•	 Does	not	have	a	variety	of	interests
•	 Is	a	good	cook
•	 Has	nice	friends
•	 Takes	care	of	his/her	physical	appearance
•	 Has	a	good	income
•	 Does	not	have	similar	tastes	to	you
•	 Is	fun	to	be	with
•	 Is	a	relaxed	and	easygoing	person
•	 Does	not	have	a	sense	of	humor
•	 Sometimes	leaves	dirty	dishes	in	the	sink
•	 Plays	pleasant	music	while	at	home
Flatmate B
•	 Has	good	grades	in	school
•	 Has	a	variety	of	interests
•	 Is	not	a	good	cook
•	 Has	nice	friends
•	 Does	not	take	care	of	his/her	physical	appearance
•	 Has	a	good	income
•	 Does	not	have	similar	tastes	to	you
•	 Is	not	fun	to	be	with
•	 Is	a	bit	uptight
•	 Has	a	sense	of	humor
•	 Sometimes	leaves	dirty	dishes	in	the	sink
•	 Plays	pleasant	music	while	at	home
Flatmate C
•	 Has	low	grades	in	school
•	 Has	a	variety	of	interests
•	 Is	not	a	good	cook
•	 Has	friends	that	are	somewhat	boring
•	 Does	not	take	care	of	his/her	physical	appearance
•	 Does	not	have	a	good	income
•	 Has	similar	tastes	to	you
•	 Is	not	fun	to	be	with
•	 Is	a	bit	uptight
•	 Has	a	sense	of	humor
•	 Does	not	leave	dirty	dishes	in	the	sink
•	 Plays	unpleasant	music	while	at	home
ExpErImEnt 3: InstructIons
a) Reasoning condition
Imagine you have to find a flatmate to share an apartment in 
London.  You  will  be  presented  with  information  about  three 
hypothetical flatmates, described by various (positive/negative) 
attributes. You will then be asked to rate your evaluation of all 
three flatmates (how “good” or “bad” you feel it would be to share a 
flat with them) on a scale of 1–10. Research has shown that the best 
decisions are made using logic and rational thought. Therefore it is 
important that you think-carefully and logically about how much 
you like each flatmate. In particular, you should think about the 
reasons you have to prefer one flatmate to another one. You will be 
given as much time as you will need to make your judgment (but 
this will be done from memory, you cannot take notes). After you 
have made your decision you will be asked to justify it by giving 
the reasons for your choice.
(b) Intuitive condition
Imagine you have to find a flatmate to share an apartment in 
London. You will now be presented with information about three 
hypothetical flatmates, described by various (positive/negative) 
attributes. You will then be asked to rate your evaluation of all 
three flatmates (how “good” or “bad” you feel it would be to 
share a flat with them) on a scale of 1–10. Research has shown 
that the best decisions are made using intuition rather than logic. 
Therefore, try to base your evaluation and choice preference on 
your GUT-FEELING about how much you like or dislike the 
three flatmates, rather than trying to think logically or rationally 
about them. You will be given as much time as you will need to 
make your judgment (but this will be done from memory, you 
cannot take notes). Remember that you should only use your 
intuitive feeling.